

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
6 September 2012

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**Letter dated 6 September 2012 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to transmit the attached letter, dated 21 August 2012, from the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Alexander Vershbow, transmitting the report on the international security presence in Kosovo, covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the annex thereto to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN Ki-moon**



Annex

In accordance with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I attach herewith a report on the operations of the Kosovo Force covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 2012 (see enclosure).

I would appreciate your making this report available to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander **Vershbow**

Enclosure

Report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo Force

Introduction

1. The present report on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is provided in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and covers the period from 1 April to 30 June 2012.
2. As at 30 June 2012, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre was approximately 5,500. This included the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operational Reserve Force Battalion still deployed in the northern part of Kosovo.

Security situation and operations

3. The overall security situation in theatre remained calm, but the northern part of Kosovo was tense. During the reporting period, KFOR continued to contribute to both the provision of a safe and secure environment and the improvement of freedom of movement in Kosovo north of the Ibar River. KFOR continued to use situational awareness to deploy manoeuvre forces and reserves rapidly to deter violence and manage crisis situations. While joint logistic convoys of KFOR and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) driving towards boundary crossing points 1 and 31 have generally been successful, EULEX convoys continue to be sporadically blocked in the northern part of Kosovo.
4. From 4 April 2012, a number of small-scale inter-ethnic incidents occurred across Kosovo that contributed to an increase in tension among the local population. Media alleged that there had been an ethnic motivation for the 8 April 2012 killing of a Kosovo Albanian citizen of North Mitrovica, in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood and traditional flashpoint of inter-ethnic violence. In order to prevent a further escalation of tension, both local Kosovo authorities and Kosovo Serb representatives in Mitrovica requested KFOR support. This led to the deployment of additional forces¹ to North Mitrovica.
5. The situation along the Administrative Boundary Line remains calm, with minor incidents being addressed at the regular meetings of the Joint Implementation Commission.
6. On 6 and 20 May 2012, Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted in Kosovo under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). KFOR increased its deterrent presence in areas where the potential for clashes was high, and postured its forces to pre-empt or respond to potential incidents throughout Kosovo. In addition, KFOR patrolled in the vicinity of sensitive areas to reassure the population and potentially prevent actions on the part of individuals, groups or organizations opposed to the elections, thus decreasing the risk of inter-ethnic clashes. No significant incidents were reported during the conduct of the elections. The close cooperation among OSCE, EULEX, Kosovo authorities and KFOR proved to be very effective in preventing major incidents and reducing the risk of violence.

¹ One KFOR tactical manoeuvre company in addition to the KFOR Multinational Specialized Unit.

7. In order to re-establish freedom of movement on the main supply road "BuLL",² KFOR took action to remove the permanent roadblock in Rudare on 1 June 2012. During this one-day operation, KFOR personnel and vehicles were engaged on several occasions by locals armed with stones and firearms. KFOR responded with the deployment of CS gas (tear gas) and anti-riot assets. Three KFOR soldiers were wounded by gunshots. On 16 June 2012, at the request of EULEX, KFOR conducted an operation to close the unauthorized boundary crossing points near DOG 31 (Brnjak), obliging Kosovo Serbs travelling between the northern part of Kosovo and central Serbia to use the authorized boundary crossing point of DOG 31. Kosovo Serbs protested in a non-violent manner, and the operation was concluded without incident.

8. As at 1 June 2012, new regulations regarding vehicle licence plates in Kosovo were being implemented as part of a Belgrade-Pristina agreement on freedom of movement. South of the Ibar River, the Kosovo Police continue to confiscate the old Serbian-issued licence plates. In the northern part of Kosovo, vehicles with old licence plates are currently allowed to cross; however, EULEX is informing drivers using gates 1 and 31 about the new requirement that vehicles display Kosovo-registered plates.

9. This year's Serb celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje (1389) on Saint Vitus Day (Vidovdan Day) were larger than in recent years. The annual two-week Vidovdan march commenced on 14 June 2012 at the Saint Sava Church in Belgrade and culminated on 28 June 2012 with a peaceful ceremony at the Gazimestan Monument in Kosovo. Approximately 3,000 Serbs attended the Gazimestan ceremony. There are conflicting reports concerning two incidents that occurred in Merdare and in the vicinity of the Victory Hotel in Pristina, although exact details are difficult to determine, as KFOR forces were not present on the ground. Throughout the commemoration period, KFOR maintained a deterrent presence in areas where the potential for clashes was high, and postured its forces to pre-empt or respond to potential incidents.

10. The transfer of responsibility for the security of the Dević Monastery from KFOR to the Kosovo Police was successfully completed on 1 June 2012. The Dević Monastery was the seventh property with designated special status to have completed the unfixing process since March 2010. The two remaining sites to be handed over to the Kosovo Police are the Dečani Monastery and the Peć Patriarchate.

Summary

11. During the reporting period, KFOR, in coordination with EULEX, Kosovo authorities and the Kosovo Police, continued to contribute to maintaining a secure environment and to ensuring freedom of movement in Kosovo. The situation in the northern part of Kosovo remained volatile, and several temporary roadblocks continued to hamper the freedom of movement of the local population, as well as EULEX logistic convoys. The May 2012 Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted under the supervision of OSCE without major incident. The close cooperation among OSCE, EULEX, the Kosovo Police and KFOR (in its third responder capacity) proved to be highly effective. KFOR continues to closely monitor the security situation on the ground and to maintain its deterrent posture to react quickly and decisively, as required.

² Main supply road connection between Mitrovica, Leposavić and gate 1.

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**General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory****Security Council
Sixty-seventh year****Identical letters dated 6 September 2012 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

In follow-up of our previous letters regarding Israel's ongoing military campaign in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, I regret to inform you that many more Palestinian civilians continue to fall victim to deadly and destructive attacks by Israel, the occupying Power, particularly in the besieged Gaza Strip.

The Israeli occupying forces have continued to carry out missile air strikes and artillery bombardment of civilian areas in the Gaza Strip, in grave violation of international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, deliberately targeting and killing Palestinian civilians. This morning, 6 September, the Israeli occupying forces killed six Palestinians in targeted strikes. Zakaria Al-Jammal, age 23, Khaled Al-Qorm, age 23, and Khalil Al-Jarba, age 27, were killed by Israeli drone missile fire attacks on Al-Bureij refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip. Ehab Al-Zaaneen, age 23, Akram Al-Zaaneen, age 22, and Talal Al-Kafarneh, age 26, were killed by Israeli artillery fire against an area in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli airstrikes continued throughout the day in the Gaza Strip, injuring several more people and causing destruction to civilian properties.

I must also draw your urgent attention once again to the destruction being caused by Israel's ongoing illegal settlement campaign in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The illegal construction of Israeli settlements and so-called "outposts" continues unabated. In this regard, today, 6 September, plans were approved for the construction of an additional 940 units in the illegal settlement of "Gilo" in the southern part of Occupied East Jerusalem. Such provocative, illegal Israeli actions continue to raise tensions and mistrust and to gravely jeopardize the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders, a solution that is totally incompatible with Israel's unlawful colonization policies and practices.



Acts of aggression and provocation by extremist Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and properties, including homes, agricultural orchards, mosques, churches and cemeteries, also continue unabated. Violence, harassment, intimidation and outright terror continue to be perpetrated by Israeli settlers throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, on a near-daily basis. Today, settlers from the "Yitzhar" settlement destroyed dozens of olive trees in the south Nablus village of Burin, and Israeli settlers from the settlement of "Mevo'ot" near Jericho set fire to farm produce belonging to a Palestinian farmer. These vile aggressions come on the heels of the destructive and hateful act of vandalism and desecration committed on 4 September by Israeli extremists against the Latrun Abbey near Jerusalem. The extremists torched the door of the Abbey, and anti-Christian graffiti, such as "Jesus is a monkey", and the word "Migron" were scrawled on the walls of this place of peace and worship.

Israeli settlers have also continued to physically attack and cause harm to Palestinian civilians in the recent period. This includes, just to name a few of the many such rabid incidents, the stoning of a bus near Ramallah by a group of Israeli settlers, which resulted in the wounding of five Palestinians; the hurling of stones by dozens of Israeli settlers at Palestinian homes in the Shu'fat neighbourhood of Occupied East Jerusalem, in which one Palestinian suffered a head injury; the stoning of Palestinian vehicles at the Hawara checkpoint in an area south of the city of Nablus; and an assault by settlers on a group of Palestinian workers paving roads in Nablus.

The impunity of these extremist settlers is no doubt bolstered by the Israeli Government's failure and clear unwillingness to hold them accountable for the constant terror that they are wreaking upon innocent Palestinian civilians. We reiterate that Israel, the occupying Power, is responsible for all of the crimes committed by the settlers whom it has transferred to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in grave breach of international humanitarian law. The international community must also act to uphold its legal responsibilities in this regard and take measures to hold Israel, the occupying Power, accountable, with the aim of compelling it to act forthwith to avert the continuation of such criminal, provocative attacks, which are aggravating tensions and religious sensitivities between the two sides and risk further destabilizing the situation on the ground.

In closing, I regret to inform you that the situation of Palestinian political prisoners illegally imprisoned and detained by Israel, the occupying Power, continues to be grave. With its ongoing arrest campaign throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel continues to add to the ranks of those Palestinians being illegally held captive. At the same time, the already deplorable conditions in which they are being held continue to deteriorate owing to Israel's blatant disregard and breach of international humanitarian and human rights law. In protest of such illegal Israeli practices, including that of administrative detention, by which nearly 300 Palestinians are being held without charge, some Palestinian detainees have now been on hunger strike for over two months' time, and their health conditions have become of grave concern. Among those on prolonged hunger strike are Samer Al-Barq (108 days), Hussein Al-Safadi (78 days), Ayman Al-Sharawneh (68 days) and Samer Al-Essawy (37 days).

We reiterate that Israel, the occupying Power, is fully responsible for the well-being, safety and lives of the thousands of Palestinians in its captivity. We reiterate

our condemnation of Israel's illegal practice of arbitrarily detaining Palestinian civilians, without charge, without revelation of evidence against them and without trial. We again call on the international community, including the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant United Nations bodies, to act urgently to compel Israel to cease its illegal practice of administrative detention, to cease all of its human rights violations against Palestinians held in its prisons and detention centres, and to act forthwith to release all of the Palestinians, including children and women, whom it is unlawfully incarcerating.

All of the above pressing issues constitute further confirmation of the dire situation that prevails in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, requiring the international community's urgent attention. Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable for all of its illegal and provocative actions. Serious measures must be undertaken to end the culture of impunity that Israel has for too long enjoyed as the international community has failed to impose consequences on the occupying Power despite its gross violations of the law, including the perpetration of war crimes. The international community, particularly the Security Council, cannot continue to stand idly by while the law is breached and international peace and security are threatened. Serious, timely efforts are needed to uphold the legal obligation to protect the Palestinian people under occupation, including the prisoners and detainees; to ensure respect for the law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention; and to salvage the chances of achieving peace and security.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 433 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 21 August 2012 (A/ES-10/561-S/2012/659), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Riyad Mansour**
Ambassador

Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

**General Assembly
Security Council**

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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Items 36, 52 and 62 of the provisional agenda*

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

The situation in the Middle East

**United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East**

**Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources**

**Identical letters dated 6 September 2012 from the Permanent
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following:

The Syrian Arab Republic has received information that the Israeli occupation authorities intend to go ahead with a project to build wind turbines in the occupied Syrian Golan, taking advantage of the location and elevation of the occupied Syrian villages as well as the current situation in the region. The Israeli company Green Wind Energy has announced a project to install a wind turbine farm, which would use the constant wind over the occupied Syrian Golan to generate electricity. That information has recently been confirmed in various Israeli media reports and by independent sources. The Israeli newspaper *Maariv* has stated that certain Israeli banks have refused to fund the project because of its location in the Golan, and that the project would generate over 14 megawatts (MW) for the region at a cost of some \$25 million. The Israeli newspaper reported that seven 80-metre wind turbines would be installed, each of which could generate around 2 MW. The financial supplement of *Maariv* indicated that the Israeli company planned to expand the project by taking on new partners in order to generate some 150 MW at a cost of \$300 million.

* A/67/150.



Other sources state that the project is part of a larger initiative. The Israeli Government has recently designated it as a "national project", thereby boosting the share price of Mei Golan, the company behind the project.

According to the Israeli newspaper *Kalkalist*, Mei Golan has signed an agreement with the Spanish company Multimatrix, granting the latter a 49 per cent share in the Mei Golan Wind Energy company, which owns and operates wind turbines to the south of Qunaytirah town. The turbines have a capacity of 6 MW, which the Israeli company is working to increase to 14 MW at a cost of between \$25 million and \$27 million. *Kalkalist* reported that the agreement between the companies would come into effect once Multimatrix had secured a sum of between 40 and 80 million shekels.

Mei Golan is also starting another joint project, with the American company AES Corporation, to build two wind farms in the occupied Syrian Golan that will generate some 400 MW of electricity. The project, which has also been designated as being of national significance by the Israeli Government, is valued at \$80 million and is expected to generate some \$130 million in revenue annually, starting in 2013. Sources have also noted that Mei Golan is conducting a marketing campaign in the villages of the northern Golan, with a view to building wind turbines on lands owned by the residents of those villages. It is offering to lease the lands on which it will build the turbines required for the project from landowners for a period of 20 years, in exchange for an annual sum.

Anemoi Global, an investment company that specializes in wind turbine technology, invited landowners from the Golan villages to a meeting at the shrine of the Prophet Elijah on 27 March 2010 in order to encourage them to derive benefit from their lands by allowing the construction of wind turbines. The meeting failed to achieve that objective owing to the attachment of the Syrian citizens of the Golan to their native country, Syria, and their belief that occupied territory must be returned to its legitimate owners.

While drawing the attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council to this dangerous Israeli project, Syria urges them to take appropriate action through the relevant frameworks in order to avert the threat the project poses to security, stability and the prospects for peace in the region. It also urges them to stop Israel from exploiting the situation in Syria in order to continue with its projects aimed at altering the natural and geographical features of the occupied Golan and plundering its resources. Such actions are in stark violation of Security Council resolution 497 (1981) and all other relevant international resolutions, as well as international instruments governing the relationship of the occupying Power with the territory and its people.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 36, 52 and 62 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bashar Ja'afari
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East**

**Security Council
Sixty-seventh year**

**Identical letters dated 6 September 2012 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of July 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf Salam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the identical letters dated 6 September 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
2 July 2012	1600	The Israeli enemy detonated a spying device that had been planted in the communications system of the Resistance in the Zirariyah area.
5 July 2012	1000	An Israeli enemy vehicle with a pole-mounted surveillance camera stopped at the Fatimah Gate-4 position and proceeded to photograph Lebanese territory.
	1130	In the area of the border barrier opposite the town of Kafr Killa, some 15 Israeli enemy journalists proceeded to photograph Lebanese territory and the separation barrier.
10 July 2012	1245	Opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal in the eastern Kurum al-Sharaqi area, four Israeli enemy personnel positioned themselves under camouflage nets 150 metres beyond the technical fence without crossing the Blue Line.
11 July 2012	0300	An Israeli enemy patrol consisting of three Merkava tanks, a Hummer jeep and a Land Rover jeep outfitted with a surveillance camera crossed the technical fence without violating the line of withdrawal, and positioned itself opposite Wazzani Park.
12 July 2012	1100	At the town of Kafr Killa, a member of an Israeli enemy patrol shouted curses and cocked and aimed his weapon in the direction of personnel at the Lebanese Army observation post located at that spot.
13 July 2012	1100	An Israeli enemy vehicle with a pole-mounted surveillance camera stopped at the Ghajar emplacement and proceeded to photograph Lebanese territory.
16 July 2012	0400	The Israeli enemy conducted engineering activities in the vicinity of Mazra'at Fashkul, at coordinates Q:747865-N:684739. It subsequently became evident that they had dug a ditch and raised an earthen berm, crossing 23 metres into Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy also removed a blue-painted stone that had indicated the position of the Blue Line, and pointed a tank cannon in the direction of Lebanese Army personnel observing their activities.
	1430	As two shepherds, one of whom, Muhammad Qasim Hashim, was a Lebanese citizen, while the other, Ahmad Haydar, was a Syrian citizen, were herding a flock south-west of the town of Shab'a, members of an Israeli enemy patrol infiltrated Lebanese territory at coordinates Q: 758597-N: 692219, and took 900 of the shepherds' goats into occupied territory. The flock was subsequently returned.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
17 July 2012	2140	From the Ayn al-Tinah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army Bastara position for two minutes.
23 July 2012	1750 1935	Near the Ruwaysat al-Alam post, the Israeli enemy sprayed intermittent medium-weapons fire, and the sound of explosions was heard.
26 July 2012	1110 1825	An Israeli enemy patrol stopped in front of the Hasan Gate, and six personnel carrying an anti-armour weapon (RPG) disembarked and aimed it in the direction of the Lebanese Army Hasan-2 position. An Israeli enemy vehicle with a pole-mounted surveillance camera stopped at the Ghajar emplacement and proceeded to photograph and observe Lebanese territory.

Sea violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
9 July 2012	2200	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the buoys for five minutes.
17 July 2012	2330	An Israeli enemy military launch opened fire in the direction of Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 3.
19 July 2012	0400	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 5 for 10 seconds.

Air violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
1 July 2012	0945	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1140 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Damur and Beirut before leaving at 2340 hours over Naqurah.
	1415	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1440	Six Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1545 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
2 July 2012	1008	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1140 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1010	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled between Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0215 hours on 3 July 2012.
3 July 2012	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1455 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled between Juniyah and Beirut before leaving at 1110 hours over Naqurah.
4 July 2012	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Damur and Beirut before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1010 hours over Rumaysh.
5 July 2012	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Naqurah.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1955 hours over Naqurah.
6 July 2012	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1330 hours over Naqurah.
	1230	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1310 hours.
8 July 2012	0925	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1210 hours.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Damur and the South before leaving at 2315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
9 July 2012	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours.
10 July 2012	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1505 hours over Aytarun.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1210 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1120 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2315	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0645 hours on 11 July 2012.
11 July 2012	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1100 hours over Naqurah.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1145 hours.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Bekaa before leaving over Kafr Killa at 0035 hours on 12 July 2012.
12 July 2012	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1145 hours over Rumaysh.
	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1125 hours over Rumaysh.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
13 July 2012	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1825 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
15 July 2012	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and the Shuf before leaving at 2315 hours over Rumaysh.
	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, and then over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1925 hours over Rumaysh.
16 July 2012	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Damur, Batrun and Jubayl before leaving at 1450 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1230 hours over Rumaysh.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Naqurah.
17 July 2012	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1340 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1825 hours over Rumaysh.
18 July 2012	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1015	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1150 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
19 July 2012	2220	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2355 hours.
	2325	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Bekaa and the North before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 1510 hours on 19 July 2012.
	0020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours over Naqurah.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Bekaa and the North before leaving at 1605 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0940	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1120 hours over Aytarun.
	0950	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1330	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1450 hours over Naqurah.
20 July 2012	2335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Bekaa and the South before leaving over Naqurah at 0755 hours on 20 July 2012.
	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Bekaa before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.
	1210	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 July 2012	1610	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1715 hours.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Naqurah.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
22 July 2012	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1950 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2355 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Bekaa before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1407	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1555 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
23 July 2012	0925	An Israeli enemy training aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Ghajar. It circled over the Lebanese Army Wazzani observation post before leaving at 0930 hours over Ghajar.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Iqlim al-Kharrub before leaving at 1625 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2035 hours over Rumaysh.
24 July 2012	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Iqlim al-Kharrub before leaving over Naqurah at 0325 hours on 24 July 2012.
	0930	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1040 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1020	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1105 hours over Rumaysh.
	1350	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Rumaysh.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	2105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon, releasing decoy flares over the Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jazzin regions, before leaving at 2300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
25 July 2012	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1330 hours over Rumaysh.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1200 hours over Rumaysh.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1450 hours over Naqurah.
26 July 2012	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1040 hours over Naqurah.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1040 hours over Rumaysh.
	2345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Juniyah and Beirut before leaving over Naqurah at 0710 hours on 27 July 2012.
27 July 2012	0757	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1435 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
28 July 2012	1350	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1425 hours.
	1800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Rumaysh.
30 July 2012	1610	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.



Security Council

Distr.: General
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Letter dated 6 September 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 30 August 2012, which I received from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon



Annex

**Letter dated 30 August 2012 from the Secretary General
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the
Secretary-General**

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2011 (2011), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from 1 May to 31 July 2012 (see enclosure). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to the request under Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2011 (2011), informs the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), covering the period from 1 May to 31 July 2012. As at 31 July 2012, total ISAF strength stood at 130,697 personnel provided by all 28 NATO countries and 22 non-NATO countries. NATO and ISAF reiterate their invitation to additional United Nations Member States to support this United Nations-mandated mission by providing advisers and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces and to increase their funding support to the Afghan security forces and their support for the civilian sectors of governance and development.

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 May to 31 July 2012, ISAF suffered 1,591 casualties including 104 killed in action, 1,481 wounded in action and 6 non-battle-related deaths.

3. During this reporting period, the number of reported security incidents was in keeping with seasonal trends. Insurgent-initiated attacks^a increased slightly each month this quarter, although the general trend was comparable to 2011. The slight increase in insurgent-initiated attacks was principally in southern Afghanistan, where the 10 most violent districts in the country generated 45 per cent of nationwide insurgent-initiated attacks. The rise in the number of those attacks was attributed mainly to a shortened poppy harvest, an earlier seasonal pre-Ramadan rise in insurgent activity, improved reporting of attacks against the Afghan security forces, and the high operational tempo maintained by the Afghan and ISAF forces. Insurgent-initiated activity focused on attempted assassinations of Government and security force officials, in order to undermine their effectiveness. Despite the media attention given to some of the high-profile attacks,^b they have been assessed by ISAF as operational failures. The Afghan security forces' reaction to the attacks, which was fast and adequate, received positive media coverage.

4. Noteworthy events for this reporting period include:

(a) On 13 May, President Karzai made the announcement of those districts and provinces that would be part of tranche 3 of the transition. The three tranches now comprise 260 districts and include all provincial capitals. Once tranche 3 is fully implemented, 75 per cent of the Afghan population will live in areas where the Afghan security forces have the lead responsibility for security;

^a Enemy-initiated attacks have been renamed insurgent-initiated attacks for this report. No definitions have been changed. Insurgent-initiated attacks comprise insurgent action (insurgent-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (explosions of improvised explosive devices/mine strikes).

^b Like the attack on forward operating base Salerno in Khost Province, Regional Command East, on 1 June 2012, and the attack on 22 June 2012 on the Spochmai Hotel in Kabul.

(b) On 13 May, the Afghan-ISAF-Pakistan Tripartite Commission met in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, to discuss cooperation and coordination along the border. This was the first meeting of the Tripartite Commission since June 2011;

(c) On 20 and 21 May, during the NATO Summit in Chicago, ISAF troop-contributing countries underlined that the ISAF mission will terminate at the end of 2014 but reaffirmed their close partnership with Afghanistan beyond the transition period, recalling the firm mutual commitments made between the broader international community and Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011. The International Conference on Afghanistan held in Tokyo on 8 July was the next international meeting to deliver concrete commitments to the promise of the long-term partnership made at Bonn. At Tokyo the international community committed US \$16 billion for the period 2012-2015 and to sustain support "at or near levels of the past decade" until the end of 2017;


(d) On 14 June, the "Heart of Asia" Ministerial Conference convened in Kabul. The Conference was attended by 28 ministerial and high-level delegations from Heart of Asia and supporting countries, including 11 delegations from regional and international organizations. NATO was represented by the NATO senior civilian representative in Kabul. The Conference was the first follow-up meeting to advance the Istanbul process, intended to strengthen regional dialogue on Afghanistan, develop confidence-building measures among Heart of Asia countries and coordinate various regional cooperation efforts on key economic, political and security issues. In spite of significant threat streams, the Afghan security forces, in close coordination with ISAF, ensured that the proceedings concluded without incident;

(e) On 4 July, Pakistan reopened the supply lines into Afghanistan after the United States issued an expression of regret for the accidental death of 24 Pakistani soldiers in an airstrike along the Afghan-Pakistani border in November 2011. The agreement ended a seven-month political stalemate that forced ISAF troop-contributing countries to use alternative logistical routes, although with minimal operational impact.

Security situation

5. During this reporting period, insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 6 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. Insurgents' efforts to maintain operations with high-profile attacks and assassinations were largely ineffective because Afghan security force and ISAF operations continued to interdict the insurgents. As a result of the improved effectiveness of the Afghan security forces, the insurgency did not regain lost territory and the majority of Afghans remained unaffected by insurgent violence.^c

^c A total of 80 per cent of the Afghan population does not directly experience the violence associated with the insurgency.




6. The insurgency continued to rely on indirect fire and the use of improvised explosive devices, trying to avoid direct engagement. The assassination attempts against Government officials remain another tactic of choice, in order to disrupt the Government's ability to carry out effective governance and to discredit it. During the reporting period, the majority of insurgent-inflicted civilian casualties (58 per cent) were caused by improvised explosive devices. The percentage of such devices found and cleared as opposed to detonated involuntarily was approximately 60 per cent.


7. Regionally, the security situation can be described as follows:^d

(a) **Regional Command Southwest.** Insurgent-initiated attacks for the reporting period increased by 13 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The end of the poppy harvest, the period from late May to early June, witnessed an immediate increase in insurgent-initiated attacks, followed by a minor drop in such attacks at the beginning of Ramadan in July. Two factors will need to be closely monitored during the next reporting period: the reduction of the surge forces in Regional Command Southwest, and the impact of an early Ramadan which could be followed by a longer insurgent fighting season before the effects of winter reduce insurgent operations. The central Helmand River Valley will remain important to the insurgents who will continue to contest it with both ISAF and the Afghan security forces.


^d Graphics are available on the ISAF webpage, at www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html.




(b) **Regional Command South.** Insurgent-initiated attacks for the reporting period increased by 6 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. It is assessed that this increase is in part the result of insurgent attempts to negate losses in their Pashto homeland during 2011. Conversely, the number of improvised explosive devices found and cleared has increased in Regional Command South over the previous three months. As in neighbouring Regional Command Southwest, the impact of a longer post-Ramadan insurgent fighting season and the reduction of surge forces remains to be seen. The insurgents continue to target the Government and the Afghan security forces to undermine the confidence of the local population in the institutions and attack the Afghan local police, which helps to prevent insurgent access to this population. Improvised explosive devices continue to be the primary means of engagement to minimize insurgent losses, followed by direct fire attacks.




(c) **Regional Command East.** During the reporting period, the most densely populated area in Afghanistan witnessed a 2 per cent decrease in insurgent-initiated attacks compared to the same period in 2011. The security incident trend for this reporting period mirrored the trend in the same period in 2011 and continues to be influenced by focused Afghan security force and ISAF operations, particularly in the border regions. The border regions of Regional Command East remain the most challenging areas and can be considered to be the main source of instability for the region. Insurgents exploit their freedom of movement and maintain the capability to plan and execute attacks in the area. The insurgency in Regional Command East is much more dispersed; individual insurgent groups follow their own agendas and have close links to organized crime in the border region.



(d) **Regional Command North.** During the reporting period, insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 29 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. While the insurgency has been unable to sustain a significant level of effort within the area of operations of Regional Command North when compared to other regional commands, there has been a slight increase in insurgent effectiveness during the current reporting period compared to the same period in 2011. The insurgency, more ethnically diverse and more closely linked to criminal organizations than in other regional commands, retains a limited capability to conduct attacks in northern Afghanistan but is still present and active. Insurgents continued to attempt high-profile attacks in major population centres attempting to reverse perceptions of security gains. Insurgents avoided sustained direct fire engagements with ISAF and focused on Afghan security force personnel as a means to undermine Government security and disrupt the development of the security forces.




(e) **Regional Command West.** During the reporting period, insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 46 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. This increase in events is largely because of aggressive ISAF security operations encroaching on insurgent support zones, continued narcotic trafficking, and the summer fighting season. Insurgent attacks against ISAF and Afghan security forces and logistical convoys are likely to continue, throughout the west of Afghanistan, to disrupt freedom of movement and attempt to regain strongholds lost during the previous fighting season.



(f) **Regional Command Capital.** During this reporting period insurgent-initiated attacks in Regional Command Capital decreased by 22 per cent compared to the same period in 2011 because of the improved capacity of the Afghan security forces and effective security measures within Kabul Province. The attack on the

"Green Village" in Kabul on 2 May 2012 and the assassination of Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban minister and key member of the Afghanistan High Peace Council, were the most significant events in this period. It is likely that Kabul Province will continue to be the target of numerous high-profile attack attempts during this fighting season because of the significant media and political attention such attacks receive.



Afghan National Security Forces

8. Over the past three months, the Afghan National Security Forces have steadily increased in overall force size and remain on track to meet the approved goal of a final strength of 352,000 by October 2012. This strength target is intended to provide security for all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and is designed to permit the consolidation of ISAF gains and to fully enable a successful transition to Afghan-led security.

9. Improvements have been made in the level of cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence in the fields of logistics and convoy execution. The quality and competence of the Afghan security forces continue to improve steadily; significant enabler support from international forces is still required, however. Partnered operations put pressure on traditional insurgent facilitation routes, while a sustained presence degrades the insurgents' ability to resupply.

10. The first Afghan security force campaign plan developed by Afghans (Operation Nawaed 1391) is currently in progress and a planning cycle has commenced for the next year. During this planning cycle, responsibility will transition from the General Staff to the new operational-level Ground Force Command once it achieves its full operational capability, which is expected in October 2012.

11. Attrition and the shortage of non-commissioned officers remain challenging for both services but efforts are being made to reduce the shortfalls. These efforts include the special leave travel programme established to facilitate movement by air

of Afghan security force personnel on leave, from designated combat zones (South, Southwest and West) to and from Kabul.

12. The percentage of Afghan security force units rated as "effective with partners" or greater has increased since January 2012 from 52 per cent to 82 per cent for Afghan National Army battalions and headquarters and from 58 per cent to 60 per cent for Afghan National Police units. The numbers of most effective units assessed as "independent with advisers" have risen to 30 for the Army (from 15 in the previous quarter), and 49 for the police (from 35 in the previous quarter). Four operation coordination centres improved their effectiveness status, reaching "independent with advisers", demonstrating a positive trend. Development of operation coordination centres is ongoing and all 40 required centres (regional or provincial) should be established and assessed during future assessment cycles.

13. ISAF will continue to work with the Afghan security forces to improve Afghan enablers (logistics, countering improvised explosive devices, aviation) to match capability gaps and prioritize the professionalization of the Afghan police, and continue to support the security forces in geographical areas of reduced ISAF presence, while meeting the requirements of the ISAF drawdown.

Afghan National Army

14. During the reporting period, the Afghan National Army reached approximately 185,000 members, not including the Afghan Air Force. The Army remains on track to meet the approved authorization of 187,000 ahead of the scheduled date of October 2012. To reach a balanced force, soldier strength must be reduced while increasing the number of non-commissioned and other officers.

15. The newly formed Special Operations Command division of the Afghan Army, a force of approximately 10,000 personnel, provides a distinctive capability that serves both as a command and a staff for a unique, enduring and elite military organization. On 25 July the Special Operations Command executed its first all-Afghan full mission exercise in preparation for a night operation. The Afghans planned and prepared the operation and Afghan helicopter crews flew the Afghan special operators and a small number of ISAF mentors to their objective.

16. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Defence, continues its efforts to professionalize the force, diminish the leadership shortfalls, decrease the attrition rates, and improve staff planning, tactical coordination, and the logistical capabilities of the Afghan Army.

Afghan Air Force

17. Over the past nine months the Afghan Air Force has made marginal gains in its force strength, reaching 5,933 personnel late in July 2012. The authorized force strength of the Afghan Air Force is 8,067 by 2017. Owing to the technical skills required throughout the Air Force, and to human capital restraints, it will continue to grow slowly. To this end, important investments are required to improve Air Force training sites and infrastructure. Consequently, the Afghan Air Force will remain dependent on donor countries and other support until it achieves full operational capability by 2017.

Afghan National Police

18. During this reporting period, the Afghan National Police reached approximately 147,000 members. The reduced growth rate was a result of a cessation in recruiting in favour of balancing the structure of policemen and non-commissioned officers within the force. However, the current growth and attrition rates indicate that the police are likely to achieve the October 2012 target of 157,000.

19. Trends in the assessment ratings of the Afghan police continued to be positive, showing increased numbers of units rated "effective with advisers" or better. The Afghan security forces will continue to focus on the police, and are preparing for 2013 being styled the Year of the Police. As the Afghan police are close to reaching their requested manning, the focus is shifting from recruiting to professionalizing the existing force through advanced training and promotion standardization. Training development is evolving and the number of Afghan instructors trained is increasing steadily (66 per cent of the positions are filled and 81 per cent of those instructors are trained). Afghan perceptions of the police appear to have generally improved as well, showing an increased awareness of their presence and generally positive trends in regard to their professionalism and independence.

Afghan Public Protection Force

20. The Ministry of the Interior approved a transition plan for the Afghan Public Protection Force to carry out Presidential Decree 62 beyond 20 March 2012 without any security gaps. The plan granted interim risk management company licences to 31 private security companies. These licences allow such companies to continue to provide security while their contracts are still under negotiation.


21. An interim risk management company is a continuation of the private security company. Upon transition to a permanent risk management company status, the guards will transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force. In the meantime guards will continue to be uniformed as with the private security companies. While existing guards were brought on through a private security company vetting process, they will complete the regular Ministry of the Interior selection process during the transition to the protection force. Because the interim licence period is not sufficient to finalize all contract negotiations, the Ministry will allow the affected companies to continue until their contract is concluded. The Public Protection Force is working with interim risk management companies that failed to meet their transition deadlines set by the Ministry to extend deadlines so that requirements for the transition can be completed. The Ministry ordered the provincial chiefs of police not to take any actions against private security companies without first consulting it. To avoid further extension of the interim licences ISAF recommended a condition-based interim licence period rather than a date-based period.

Civilian casualties

22. Civilian casualties are of great concern to ISAF, and the need to effectively manage the consequences of such incidents is considered to be critically important. ISAF has been successful at reducing civilian casualties, and continues to emphasize adherence to the Directives of the Commander of ISAF to avoid future civilian casualties. In the period from 1 January to the end of July 2012, reduction efforts

produced a 51 per cent reduction in ISAF-caused civilian casualties compared to the same period in 2011.

23. Reporting for the current quarter indicates that the insurgents are responsible for causing approximately 87 per cent of all civilian conflict-related deaths and more than 92 per cent of all incidents with related civilian casualties. ISAF was identified as having responsibility for 8 per cent of all such incidents, including the responsibility for 13 per cent of civilian conflict-related deaths. The figures reported in the chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. ISAF policy requires all credible allegations of civilian casualties to be reviewed.^e



Counter-narcotics

24. ISAF continues, in conformity with its mandate, to provide support to the counter-narcotics programmes and operations of the Government of Afghanistan in order to disrupt, neutralize and influence the narcotics industry and its funding of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

25. Since the conclusion of the poppy harvest in the major producing areas, poor opium yields have been reported in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Farah, Nimroz and Nangarhar. The poor crop resulted from the shifting of poppy cultivation to areas with poor growing conditions, undesirable weather for cultivation, and poor farming practices by new, inexperienced poppy farmers. Opium prices have increased slightly as a result of a decrease in the opium yield, but not as dramatically as the price increase resulting from the 2010 poppy blight.

^e Graphics are available on the ISAF web page, at www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html.

26. Afghan security force and ISAF operations in key narcotics processing and trafficking areas in southern Afghanistan have limited some narcotics movement and increased the risks associated with narcotics trafficking. In addition, during this reporting period, particularly during the month of May, substantial narcotics seizures were made by the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, which included over 19,000 kg of opium and 550 kg of heroin in the months of May and June alone.

27. A decrease in harvest output along with ongoing counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency operations presents an opportunity to pressure insurgent funding streams. Continuing to limit the freedom of movement of narcotic traffickers will increase the risks associated with trafficking, which will result in a depression of opium prices. This could be one reason why opium prices have only marginally increased, instead of spiking as in 2010. Furthermore, the inherent risks associated with a poor crop and depressed prices will aid in any campaign to deter poppy cultivation.

Governance

28. ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of transition, reintegration, counter-corruption and rule of law improvement.

29. Security responsibility continues to be transitioned from ISAF to the Afghan security forces and, as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police develop, they are taking an increasing lead in conducting security operations. One important indicator of the success of the transition is the 15 per cent decline in insurgent-initiated attacks on average year over year in tranche 1 and 2 areas. As the transition continues, planning for the period beyond 2014 develops and work has been done to synchronize understanding of the campaign between ISAF, Afghan security ministries, non-security ministries, the Afghan security forces and the international community.

30. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme is still encountering challenges, but has seen improvements in implementation capacity in the past quarter. However, provincial joint secretariat teams are still in need of support and the joint secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme and ISAF are working to address this through mentoring and formal training. As at 31 July 2012, the Peace and Reintegration Programme had officially reintegrated a total of 5,036 insurgents. This represents an increase of around 1,000 persons reintegrated over the previous quarter.

31. Formal reintegration has contributed stabilizing effects in the north and west, where the programme has had most success. Encouraging progress has been noticed recently in the east, south and south-west, but it is more likely that informal reintegration occurs in those regions because of a lack of security in some areas, fear of Taliban retaliation for reintegrating, and cultural, honour-based sensitivities. A Joint Ministerial Order issued in June directed the Afghan security forces to support and promote the Peace and Reintegration Programme. Consequently, training measures were implemented in order to spread awareness of the Programme.

32. Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr provide an opportunity for the Government of Afghanistan to leverage a cultural and religious event to provide reintegration

impact on a national level. Also at this level, a National Peace and Unity Week is planned for September 2012 with a range of Afghan-led countrywide events to demonstrate the Government's commitment.

33. The NATO-led building integrity initiative continues to develop the capabilities of the Afghan Ministries of Defence and the Interior to support the Afghan security forces. For the period 2012-2014, priority will be given to the planning and management of financial and human resources. This work will be taken forward in the framework of the Enduring Partnership. The building integrity group continued its work with the NATO Training Mission on reviewing the integration of appropriate courses for the security forces in order to ensure the integration of good governance and anti-corruption practice and process. On 26 July, President Karzai issued a Presidential Decree that focuses on improving governance and tackling corruption. The Decree reflects the President's stated determination to address these issues.

34. The NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission continues to work with the Government to improve the provision of State justice with qualified personnel at the provincial and district levels. The support mission also continues to assist the Afghans in countering threat networks through the development of Afghan forensics and biometrics capabilities.

Development

35. Together with the transition implementation in the provinces, the provincial reconstruction teams are in the process of transferring their functions to the Government and channelling enduring assistance through the Government or traditional development actors (international and non-governmental organizations and the private sector). The countries providing the teams agreed on a set of principles for the evolution and ultimate dissolution of their teams, many of which are already evolving, shifting their focus from direct delivery to enhancing the effectiveness of Afghan national and provincial government structures. By the time transition is complete, all teams will have handed over their functions to the Government, traditional development actors, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and will have been phased out. Pursuing this process, one team closed during the reporting period (United States team Laghman) and four more could close in 2012. As at the end of the reporting period, 25 provincial reconstruction teams remain operating in Afghanistan, but all will be transferred by the end of 2014.

Children affected by armed conflict

36. ISAF stays committed to its support for monitoring and reporting violations against children by armed actors, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). ISAF and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan have jointly taken several practical steps to support Afghan institutions in implementing an action plan to stop and prevent grave violations of children's rights, including actions to prevent underage recruitment to the Afghan security forces, sexual abuse and killing and maiming of children.

Resolution 1325 (2000) and gender perspective

37. The implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) is still an ISAF priority internally as well as externally. ISAF focuses on establishing more concrete policies and guidelines through standard operating procedures and fragmentary orders and on increasing awareness through standardized in-theatre training.

38. ISAF continues to monitor and support the Government of Afghanistan in creating a more gender-sensitive environment. Although there is a growing recognition for female roles in the Afghan security forces, women account for roughly 1 per cent of the total force. As at 20 June 2012, there were 1,409 women members in the Afghan police, 379 in the Afghan Army and 27 in the Afghan Air Force. The Government has established target numbers (to be reached by the end of 2015) for women members of the security forces but there are still obstacles to be overcome before the objectives will be met. These challenges are on the one hand of a material and structural nature but on the other hand they are also of a cultural nature. In the police force, women's training and participation is often not valued, their presence is deemed pointless, and consequently they are marginalized and relegated to non-police work.

39. ISAF continues its proactive work towards the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), and welcomes the continued efforts of the international community to encourage the Government to integrate the gender perspective as a natural part of the social and political environment in Afghanistan. Although the political and social representation of women increased, their effective participation in political processes and economic activities remains limited. Furthermore, violations of women's rights remain prevalent despite existing legislation, while women's access to education and health services remains low.